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Abstract— This paper proposes a model of inspection of a 
protection system in which the inspection outcome provides 
imperfect information of the state of the system. The system itself 
is required to operate on demand typically in emergency 
situations. The purpose of inspection is to determine the 
functional state of the system and consequently whether the 
system requires replacement. The system state is modeled using 
the delay time concept in which the failed state is preceded by a 
defective state. Imperfect inspection is quantified by a set of 
probabilities that relate the system state to the outcome of the 
inspection. The paper studies the effect of these probabilities on 
the efficacy of inspection. The analysis indicates that preventive 
replacement mitigates low quality inspection and that inspection 
is cost-effective provided the imperfect-inspection probabilities 
are not too large. Some derivative policies in which replacement 
is “postponed” following a positive inspection are also studied. 
An isolation valve in a utility network motivates the modeling. 
 
Index Terms— Preventive maintenance; replacement; quality 
of service; protection system; delay-time model 
 
NOTATION 
T, T* The inspection interval (a decision variable) and its 
optimum value 
M, M* Number of inspections until preventive replacement 
(a decision variable) and its optimum value 
X  System age at defect arrival with s-density, s-
distribution and reliability functions  Xf , XF , XF  
Y  Delay-time from defect arrival to subsequent failure 
(time in defective state) with s-density, s-
distribution and reliability functions  Yf , YF , YF  
G, D, F System states: good, defective, failed, respectively 
P, N Inspection outcomes: positive, negative 
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  Imperfect inspection probability Pr(P G)  
1  Imperfect inspection probability Pr(N D)  
2  Imperfect inspection probability Pr(N F)  
  Mean of exponential delay-time distribution 
  Characteristic life parameter of Weibull defect 
arrival distribution 
  Shape parameter of Weibull defect arrival 
distribution 
Ic  cost of an inspection 
Rc  cost of a replacement 
Fc   downtime cost-rate 
U  cost of a renewal cycle 
W  downtime in a renewal cycle 
V  length of a renewal cycle 
Q  long-run total cost per unit time, cost-rate (objective 
function) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper studies a protection or preparedness system 
subject to imperfect inspection. This system is required to 
operate on demand typically in emergency situations. Such 
protection systems include military defense systems, medical 
equipment (e.g. defibrillators), automobile airbags, isolation 
valves, fire suppressors and alarms, secondary power supplies, 
and flood defenses. The Thames barrier [1] is an example of 
the latter. If this system fails to operate when the water level 
of the river is predicted to flood London then estimates of the 
cost of such a failure are tens of billions of pounds. These 
systems are inspected or tested on a regular basis to determine 
their functional state. Thus, isolation valves are closed and 
opened, cold-standby pumps are started, and the Thames 
barrier is raised. Such “inspections” incur significant costs. 
Therefore, system owners wish to know how often inspections 
should be performed and if inspection is effective. 
In the proposed model, inspection is imperfect, so that the 
true functional state of the system cannot be known with 
certainty. The efficacy of inspection is then suspect, and there 
may exist circumstances in which inspection is not sufficiently 
effective to be economically justified. Such imperfect testing 
has been considered for critical systems (e.g. [2-4]), and for 
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protection systems (e.g. [5,6]). These latter works are 
extended in this paper by supposing that a protection system is 
subject to a three-state failure process and inspection is 
imperfect. In the three-state failure process, a failure is 
preceded by the defective state and sojourns in the good and 
defective states are random variables [7,8]. This is the delay-
time concept, developed initially by Christer [9], and later 
extended by many others for protection systems (e.g. [3,6-
8,10,11]) and for critical systems (e.g. [12-17]).  The sojourn 
in defective state is the delay-time. For a critical system, 
failure is self-announcing and the object of inspection is 
failure prevention. For a protection system, failure is not self-
announcing and the object of inspection is to reveal the 
functional state of the system—that is, to determine whether 
the protection system will operate in the event of a demand for 
its function.  
Others have extended the delay-time concept to critical 
systems with minor and major defect states, to model real 
systems more closely. However, imperfect inspection is 
modelled in a more restrictive way than we consider here in 
this paper. In [18,19], the minor-defect state may be missed at 
an inspection, whereas here is this paper inspection may 
misclassify both the defective and the failed states, albeit with 
lower probabilities in the latter case. In [20], inspection is 
perfect but replacements may be delayed. This is a different 
idea.  
The possibility of the defective state itself can explain 
inspection errors. For example, an isolation valve (see e.g. 
[10]) that is either good or failed may be clearly indicated as 
such on inspection, but one that is defective may be more 
difficult to correctly classify as operational. This issue also 
arises in medical screening tests, whereby early disease stages 
are undetectable and the screening error-rate decreases as the 
disease develops [21]. Furthermore, degradation may be more 
likely to be overlooked in its early stages than in more 
advanced stages. This may be the result of perception of a 
maintainer that low degradation implies an insignificant risk 
of failure. Of course, in reality better testing-systems may 
provide better information about the states of systems and sub-
systems. Nonetheless, it is important to study, in an idealized 
situation (the model), the effect of imperfect inspection upon 
the efficacy and efficiency of protection systems with a 
defective state. This can inform maintenance policy and 
decision making for real systems [22], in order to mitigate the 
serious consequences of an unmet demand. The approach 
taken in the paper is related to the notion of quality of 
maintenance [23], and there is a growing literature concerned 
with mistakes of perception [24,25], demonstrating increasing 
concern about human influence on the performance of a 
system.  
The proposed model supposes that the outcome of an 
inspection provides imperfect information about the true 
condition (state) of the protection system. The protection 
system is subject to periodic inspection and the outcome of the 
inspection determines whether the system is replaced. The 
cost-rate (long-run total cost per unit time of maintenance and 
downtime due to failure) and availability of the protection 
system are determined. The paper then studies the effect of the 
model parameters on the behavior of these criteria. The paper 
also proposes a further policy in which the maintainer 
postpones action (replacement) either until a succession of 
positive inspections has occurred or for a fixed time period, in 
order to quantify the consequences of postponement. An 
isolation valve in a utility network motivates the numerical 
example that is described. 
In the next section, the model of the principal policy is 
specified and expressions for the cost-rate and the availability 
are developed. Then the numerical example and study the 
policy behavior are presented. Postponement-type policies are 
then described in a similar fashion. The paper finishes with 
conclusions: a summary of findings and a discussion of 
limitations, potential developments and implications for the 
management of maintenance.  
II. THE MODEL 
A. Model Specification 
In what follows, the system is a single, non-repairable 
component and a socket that together performs an operational 
function [26] on demand.  
This system deteriorates over time, but also may be subject 
to external shocks (e.g. a dredger crashed into a pier of the 
Thames barrier, sank, and damaged a gate and the flood 
defense system was not operational for a period). The failure 
process is modeled using the delay-time model [9,27], 
whereby the system may be in one of three states: good (G), 
defective (D); and failed (F). Times in the good and the 
defective state are random variables that are themselves 
mutually s-independent.  
It is assumed that: 
1. the system will operate on demand if it is in state G or D, 
but not if it is in state F; 
2. inspections are scheduled at system ages kT , 1,...,k M= , 
and replacement is scheduled at system age MT regardless 
of the system state at MT . 
3. the purpose of inspection is to determine if the system will 
operate in the event of a demand; 
4. an inspection outcome is either positive, P (the inspection 
test indicates the system would not operate on demand), or 
negative, N (the inspection test indicates the system would 
operate on demand); 
5. the inspection outcome is related to the system state 
through the probabilities specified in Table I; 
TABLE I 
IMPERFECT INSPECTION PROBABILITIES 
  system state  
  G D F 
inspection 
outcome  
N 1 −  1  2  
P   11 −  21 −  
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6. if the inspection outcome is P then the system is replaced, 
and if it is N the system is not replaced; 
7. replacement and renewal are synonymous; 
8. the times taken to carry out inspection and replacement are 
negligible;  
9. when the system is in state F, a downtime penalty cost with 
rate Fc  is incurred; this in a sense is what the decision-
maker is prepared to pay per unit of time to prevent the 
consequences of the event against which the system 
provides protection [28,29]; 
10. the cost of an inspection is Ic  and the cost of a 
replacement is Rc . 
Notice that assumptions 3), 4) and 6) imply that the 
outcome of inspection effectively determines whether the 
system is replaced. Assumption 5) implies that inspection does 
not determine the system state. An inspection outcome that 
classifies system state (as G, D or F), albeit with imprecision, 
leads to a different model to that is not studied in this paper.  
Inspection alone cannot guarantee high availability of the 
system because inspection is imperfect, and the extent of the 
imperfection (and the cost) will determine whether inspection 
is effective. Consequently, the purpose of the model is to 
analyze circumstances in which inspection is effective, 
whence * 1M  , and in which it is not, whence * 1M = .  
Inspection models in the literature are broadly of two types. 
The first type models the idea that inspection of a hot-
system (or critical system) reveals a state that precedes failure. 
This is the delay-time model [9,27]. The purpose of this model 
is to plan inspections. The second type models the idea that 
inspection reveals the functional state of a cold-system 
(a protection system with unrevealed failure) [28,29]. The 
purpose is the same: to plan inspections. For inspection 
models of the first type, imperfect testing has been modeled in 
[30,31]. There, the inspection outcome may misclassify the 
underlying state of the system. For inspection models of the 
second type, imperfect inspection has also been studied 
[5,6,32-34], and again therein inspection may misclassify the 
system state. This paper conflates these types: the system in 
the model is a protection system (cold-system) that can be in a 
defective state. Thus, the novelty of the approach is to model 
imperfect inspection of a system with unrevealed failure and 
an unrevealed defective state, and to do so by stochastically 
relating the inspection outcome to the un-observed state of the 
(degrading) system.  
The model is motivated by an isolation valve in a network 
used to transport a dangerous product. The valve is a 
protection system that is required to operate on demand. For 
example, the valve is normally open and in the event of 
damage to a part of the network, shutting the valve isolates the 
damaged part of the network and prevents contamination of 
the environment by the product. Such isolation valves 
deteriorate with age, are inspected, and replacement of a failed 
valve is important. 
Inspection corresponds to shutting the valve and measuring 
the downstream flow-rate, R. The inspection outcome is 
regarded as positive if PR r , and negative otherwise. In the 
good state, G, the actual flow rate through the shut valve 
(leakage) is small (e.g. < 0.1% of normal flow). In the 
defective state, D, the leakage is moderate, and in the failed 
state, F, the leakage is large (e.g. > 2% of normal flow). The 
measured flow-rate, R, through the shut valve may be related 
to leakage (and hence the state of the valve) by the imperfect 
inspection probabilities: PPr( G)R r  = , P 1Pr( D)R r  =  
and P 2Pr( F)R r  = . Error in the measurement of R 
underlies the imperfection of inspection. This example 
illustrates two points in the model. Firstly, the inspection 
outcome and the system state are stochastically related. 
Secondly, it is natural that 1 2   (although this is not a 
requirement of the model), since the measured flow rate is less 
likely to be small when the leakage is large than when it is 
moderate. Thus, the valve may fail the inspection test (test 
positive) when it is defective, but it is less likely to do so than 
when it is failed. To the knowledge of the authors, these two 
types of false negative probabilities, 1 and 2, which relate 
inspection outcome to the underlying state of a system with 
unrevealed failure, have been not previously modeled in the 
literature. 
This inspection process has similarities to destructive 
testing (e.g. [35]), whereby the destructive testing of an item 
provides imperfect information about the state other 
stochastically identical items. 
In a special case one might suppose 2 0 = , so that when 
the system is failed the test reveals the true operational state, 
and that when the system is defective the inspection does not. 
If instead the inspection outcome can be G, D or F 
(imperfectly), then other models may be considered. A 
maintainer may wish to take an action that follows a D 
(inspection says component is defective) that is different to the 
action that follows an F (inspection says component is failed). 
Thus, suppose the system is inspected at some time kT , 
and the outcome is D. Then, the decision maker may wish to 
take immediate action or to postpone action until new 
information or an opportunity (see [31] and the references 
therein) becomes available. Given 0  , this D may be a 
false positive, and given that the system can perform its 
operational function when defective anyway, the action might 
be not to replace but to inspect at ( 1)k T+ . However, this is a 
different model to the one studied here. Nonetheless, there 
may exist circumstances in which the maintainer does not take 
immediate action following a positive inspection, either 
deferring a decision to the next inspection, say, or postponing 
replacement. Policies that postpone action are the subject of 
section IV. 
B. Development of the Cost-Rate 
Consider then the policy introduced in section II.A: 
schedule inspections at ages kT , ( 1,..., )k M= , and replace 
the system if an inspection outcome is P. If the system reaches 
age MT , replace the system regardless of whether the 
inspection outcome is P or N; this is preventive replacement. 
The cost-rate, ( , )Q M T , is derived so that the cost-optimal 
policy ( , )M T
 
 may be determined. Also, the properties of 
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( , )Q M T  and ( , )M T
 
 with respect to the parameters, most 
notably the inspection parameters, may be studied.  
Let K be the number of inspections until renewal. 
Now Pr( 1)K =  depends on whether 1M =  or 1M  . If 
1M =  then Pr( 1) 1K = =  because renewal must occur at time 
T. When 1M  , it follows that 
2
0
1
0
Pr( 1) (1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 ) ( ) ( )d ( ). (1)
T
Y X
T
Y X X
K F T x f x x
F T x f x x F T

 
= = − −
+ − − +


 
The first term is the probability of failure before T and the 
outcome of inspection is P given the system is failed (this is 
the 2(1 )−  in the term). The second term is the probability 
that a defect arises before T, does not fail by T, and the 
outcome of inspection is P given the system is defective (this 
is the 1(1 )−  in the term). The third term is the probability of 
no defect by T and the outcome of inspection is P given the 
system is good (this is the   in the term). The events 
corresponding to three terms are pictorially represented in 
Fig.1 
Thus, there is a careful distinction between the inspection 
outcome and the system state. The system state is unknown 
and unobserved. The inspection outcome is not an observation 
of the system state. If inspection is N for example, the system 
state remains unknown. Only a demand for the operation of 
the system can reveal the state of the system. But in the model 
there are no demands. Instead, a cost is incurred for the time 
that the system is F. It is not known for how long the system is 
in state F. But the expectation of this quantity is known, 
conditional on renewal at a particular inspection.  
 
Fig. 1. Possible system states at first inspection. ○ defect arrival, ● failure, ● 
failure prevented by inspection 
 
Thus, for example, if on inspection a flood barrier rises then 
the inspection outcome is N. But that does not mean that the 
state of the barrier is G (or even G or D). It could be F, 
because in the event of a real demand the barrier may not 
operate, perhaps because the conditions of the test and the 
conditions of the demand event (flood) are different. An 
inspection arguably can never reproduce exactly the 
conditions that exist at the time of a real demand (c.f. fire 
safety drills). If it did, then 1 2 0  = = = . For the case of 
the barrier one would hope that these inspection error 
probabilities are very close to zero. At Fukushima [36], 
protection systems (to supply power in the event of a flood) 
would have been tested on a regular basis and would have 
been found to be operational. If not the plant would have been 
shut down. Nonetheless, when the ultimate flood occurred 
there was no power from any system available to shut down 
the reactors.  
Consider now 2K = . 
When 2M  , Fig.2 shows six cases, or more precisely 
three sets of cases (system in failed state at 2T , system in 
defective state at 2T , and system in good state at 2T ). In the 
first set (that the system is in the failed state at 2T ) the defect 
can arise either in the first inspection interval or the second 
and the failure in the same inspection interval or if possible the 
subsequent, and in the second set, the defect can arise either in 
the first inspection interval or the second.  
Thus 
 
2 2
0
1 2
0
2
2
1 1
0
2
1
Pr( 2, 2) (1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 ) (2 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 )(1 ) (2 ) ( )d
(1 ) (2 ) ( )d
(1 )(1 ) (2 ) ( )d
(1 ) (2 ). (2)
T
Y X
T
Y Y X
T
Y X
T
T
Y X
T
Y X
T
X
K M F T x f x x
F T x F T x f x x
F T x f x x
F T x f x x
F T x f x x
F T
 
 
 
 
 
 
=  = − −
+ − − − −
+ − − −
+ − −
+ − − −
+ −





 
 
Fig. 2. Possible system states at second inspection given no replacement at 
first inspection. 
 
When 2M = , 2K =  if an only if the system is not renewed 
at the first inspection. Therefore only events in the first 
interval (Fig.3) are of concern and the first inspection is itself 
N F  (with probability 2 ) or N D  (with probability 1 ) or 
N G  (with probability 1 − ). 
  
 
Fig. 3. Replacement at second inspection, considering events arising in the 
first inspection. 
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Thus 
2
0
1
0
Pr( 2, 2) ( ) ( )d
( ) ( )d (1 ) ( ). (3)
T
Y X
T
Y X X
K M F T x f x x
F T x f x x F T

 
= = = −
+ − + −


 
Proceeding to the general case K k= , for M k  there are 
three cases again: 
• the system is in the failed state at kT , and the defect arose 
in any interval 1,...,i k=  and the consequent failure in any 
interval ,...,j i k= , and the inspection is P F ; 
• the system is in the defective state at kT , and the defect 
arose in any interval 1,...,i k= , and the inspection is P D ; 
• and the system is in the good state at kT  and the inspection 
is P. 
Thus for 2,..., 1k M= −  ( 2M  ), it follows that 
  
1
2 21 ( 1)
1 1
2 1 21 1
( 1)
1
1 11 ( 1)
1
Pr( )
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 ) (1 )
( ) (( 1) ) ( )d
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 ) ( ). (
iTk i k i
Y Xi i T
k k j i k ji
i j i
iT
Y Y X
i T
iTk i k i
Y Xi i T
k
X
K k
F iT x f x x
F jT x F j T x f x x
F kT x f x x
F kT
  
   
  
 
− −
= −
− − −−
= = +
−
− −
= −
−
= =
− − −
+ − −
 − − − −
+ − − −
+ −
 
 

 
4)
 
In this expression, the first two terms correspond to the case 
in which the system is in the failed state at kT . The first of 
these terms corresponds to the defect arising in the i-th 
inspection interval and the failure occurring in the same 
interval, with this failure being undetected until kT  (this is the 
factor 2
k i − ). The second term corresponds to the defect 
arising in the i-th inspection interval and the failure occurring 
in a later interval, with imperfect inspections, N D , occurring 
at the intervening inspections (this is the factor 1
j i − ) and the 
failure being undetected until kT  (this is the factor 2
k j − ). In 
both terms the factor 
1(1 )i −−  is the probability of N G at 
each inspection prior to the defect arrival, and this must be the 
case otherwise the system would have been renewed earlier. 
The third term corresponds to the second case in the bullets 
above and the last term to the third case. 
For k M=  ( 2M  ), noting that replacement occurs at 
MT  regardless of whether the inspection outcome is P or N, it 
follows that 
  
1 1
21 ( 1)
2 1 1
1 21 1
( 1)
1 1
11 ( 1)
1
Pr( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 )
( ) (( 1) ) ( )d
(1 ) (( 1) ) ( )d
(1 ) (( 1) ).
iTM i M i
Y Xi i T
M M j i M ji
i j i
iT
Y Y X
i T
iTM i M i
Y Xi i T
M
X
K M
F iT x f x x
F jT x F j T x f x x
F M T x f x x
F M T
 
  
 

− − −
= −
− − − −−
= = +
−
− − −
= −
−
= =
− −
+ −
 − − − −
+ − − −
+ − −
 
 

 
 
The first term in this expression corresponds to the case 
when a defect arises in the i-th inspection interval and causes a 
failure in the same interval and all subsequent inspections at 
least as far as the 1M − th are negative. The second term 
(double sum) corresponds to a defect arising in the i-th 
inspection interval and causing a failure in a later interval but 
no later than the 1M − th and all subsequent inspections at 
least as far as the 1M − th are negative. The third term 
corresponds a defect arising in the i-th inspection interval and 
no failure occurring until at least the 1M − th inspection. 
Notice further if 1 2 0 = =  in this expression, then 
immediately this reduces to  
1Pr( ) (1 ) (( 1) )M XK M F M T
−= = − −  
as required because in this case, for renewal to occur at MT , 
the first 1M −  inspections must each be N G  and no defect 
can have arisen by ( 1)M T− . 
Then letting MV  be the length of a renewal cycle, it follows 
that  
1
( ) Pr( )
M
M k
E V kT K k
=
= = . 
The calculation of the costs and the cost of a renewal cycle, 
MU , proceeds as follows. 
First denote the downtime in a cycle by W. Then note 
carefully that downtime occurs if and only if the system fails, 
and that failures are not self-announcing and the true system 
state is observed neither at failures nor at inspections. In 
reality, failure is only observed at external demands for the 
system function that occur when the system is failed. 
However, the model considers these demands only in the 
standard way [28,29] through a downtime cost-rate  that is 
equivalent to the notion that demands arise according to a 
Poisson process with a fixed rate and severity.  
Define the event Fk  that the system fails and the system is 
renewed at kT . Then, when Fk  occurs, the downtime is 
kW kT X Y= − − . 
Let kI  be an indicator function for the event Fk . Observe 
that 1kI =  if and only if 0jI =  1,...,j k M = . It therefore 
follows that  
1
M
k kk
W W I
=
=  . 
Therefore 
1
( ) ( )
M
k kk
E W E W I
=
=  ,                    (5) 
and for 1k =  ( 1M  ) 
1 1 2
0 0
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )d d
T T x
Y XE W I T x y f y f x y x
−
 = − − −  , 
and for 1M =  
1 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d d
T T x
Y XE W I T x y f y f x y x
−
 = − −  ,    (5b) 
and for 2,..., 1k M= −  ( 2M  ) 
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 
 
1
2 21
( 1) 0
1 1
2 1 21 1
( 1) ( 1)
( ) (1 ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )d d
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )d d ,
k i k i
k k i
iT iT x
Y X
i T
k k j i k ji
i j i
iT jT x
Y X
i T j T x
E W I
kT x y f y f x y x
kT x y f y f x y x
  
   
− −
=
−
−
− − −−
= = +
−
− − −
 = − −
 − −
+ − −
 − −

 
 
 
 
and for k M=  ( 1M  ) 
 
 
1
21
( 1) 0
1 1
1 21 1
( 1) ( 1)
( ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )d d
(1 )
( ) ( ) ( )d d .
M i M i
M M i
iT iT x
Y X
i T
M M j i M ji
i j i
iT jT x
Y X
i T j T x
E W I
MT x y f y f x y x
MT x y f y f x y x
 
  
− −
=
−
−
− − −−
= = +
−
− − −
 = −
 − −
+ −
 − −

 
 
 
 
Explaining these expressions a little, in the formula for 
( )k kE W I , for 2,..., 1k M= −  ( 2M  ), for example, two 
terms can be distinguished. In the first term the defect and the 
consequent failure arise in the same interval, and the 
preceding inspections are each N G  with probability 
1(1 )i −− , and the subsequent inspections are N F  with 
probability 2
k i − , and the ultimate inspection, where renewal 
occurs, is P F with probability 2(1 )− . In the second term 
the defect and the consequent failure arise in the different 
intervals and the intervening inspections are each N D  with 
probability 1
j i − . Some cases are illustrated for 1, 2,3k =  
( 3)M   in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig.4. Some cases that illustrate the calculation of the downtime.   
 
When 1M = , and downtime occurs, the defect and the 
failure arise in the first and only interval, there are no 
inspections and so no inspection related probabilities.  
When 1k =  ( 1M  ), and downtime occurs, then the 
failure must have occurred in the first interval and the first 
inspection must be P F .  
The expected cost of a renewal cycle is the sum of the cost 
of inspections, the cost of downtime, and the cost of renewal 
(which itself occurs with probability 1), so that 
 
1
I 1
I F R
( ) Pr( )
( 1) Pr( ) ( ) ,
M
M k
E U c k K k
M c K M c E W c
−
=
= =
+ − = + +
       ( 1M  ),         
F R( ) ( )ME U c E W c= + .                 ( 1M = ). 
    
Further notice that the model arbitrarily chooses not to incur 
the inspection cost at MT . The rationale for this or otherwise 
has been discussed at length in [5]. The formulae above are 
altered in a small way if it is assumed otherwise:  
I F R1
( ) Pr( ) ( )
M
M k
E U c k K k c E W c
=
= = + + ,   ( 1M  ),                            
I F R( ) ( )ME U c c E W c= + + ,          ( 1M = ).                                      
Finally, the long-run cost per unit time or cost-rate by the 
renewal-reward theorem [37] is ( , ) ( ) / ( )M MQ M T E U E V= , 
and the availability is ( , ) 1 ( ) / ( ( ))A M T E W T E K= −  . 
When M is not finite (pure inspection policy), the expected 
cost per cycle and the expected cycle length are  
I F R1
( ) Pr( ) ( )
k
E U c k K k c E W c

 =
= = + + , 
1
( ) Pr( )
k
E V kT K k

 =
= = , 
where 
1
( ) lim ( ) lim ( )
M
M M k kk
E W E W E W I → → == =   
in (5) and Pr( )K k=  is given by (4), and the cost-rate is 
( , ) ( ) / ( )Q T E U E V  = , and the availability is 
( , ) 1 ( ) / ( ( ))A T E W T E K = −  . 
Notice that ( ) lim ( )M ME U E U →=  and 
( ) lim ( )M ME V E V →= . Therefore the pure inspection 
policy appears as a special case of the policy with preventive 
replacement when M →  . 
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this study, the unit of cost is set equal to the cost of a 
replacement, so that R 1c = . The inspection cost and the 
downtime cost-rate are specified as I 0.05c =  and F 5c = , 
respectively. For the isolation valve example discussed in the 
introduction, suppose that the demand rate is 0.1 per year (1 
loss of product every 10 years) and the cost of a contamination 
event is $100,000. Then the cost-rate of unmet demands is 
$10,000 per year. This in turn suggests a cost of renewal (of 
the valve mechanism) of $2,000 and an inspection cost of 
$100. 
The time until a defect occurs is assumed have a Weibull 
distribution, thus exp{ ( / ) }XF x
= − , with characteristic life 
10 =  in an arbitrary time unit and shape 3 =  (noting that 
valve-mechanism life of 10 years would seem reasonable).  
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The delay-time is assumed to be exponential, 
exp( / )YF x = − , with mean 1 = . This assumption is 
considered for the numerical results but is not a restriction of 
the model.  
Inspection parameters are set to 1 20.2 0.1 =  =  and 
0.1 = . 
This set of parameters values is called the base case. Table 
II presents the cost-optimal policy for this base case (case 2, 
shaded), and for other cases in which parameter values are 
varied. The ( , )M T  policy is considered along with two 
special cases, 1M =  (no inspection and thus age-based 
replacement) and M =   (pure inspection).  
Firstly it can be seen that as   decreases, inspections 
become more frequent to compensate for the greater variance 
in the time to defect arrival, to the extent that when   is 
smallest, pure inspection is near cost-optimal, and when   is 
largest, age-based replacement is cost-optimal. Here, the cost-
rate increases by 42% and the availability decreases 
accordingly. In addition, Figure 5 shows that in early life (
7x  ) the hazard rate of a defect arrival decreases with  . 
The reverse is true in later life. Thus, the optimum inspection 
interval appears to be adapted to the initial behavior of the 
hazard rate, a point noted in [38] which proposes a two-phase 
inspection policy that has lower costs and greater availability 
than the single-phase inspection policy. An extension of the 
(M,T) policy to a two-phase policy ( 1 1 2 2, , ,M T M T ) could be 
analysed in a further study.  
When M is finite and   1  or 2  increase, then T* 
increases. However the corresponding M* decreases and so 
does M*T*. Thus, inspection is relaxed due to its decreasing 
quality, but this is mitigated by earlier preventive 
maintenance. When the pure inspection policy is considered (
M =  ), then the same behavior with   is observed but the 
situation is just the opposite (T* decreases) when 1  or 2  
increases. In this case, because there is no preventive 
maintenance, more frequent inspection is the best means to 
avoid defects or failures that remain undetected due to low 
quality inspections. 
 
 
TABLE II 
RESULTS 
         ( , )M T policy  
No inspection, 
1M =  
 Pure inspection, 
M =   
Case 𝛿 λ 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛼 Ic  Fc   *T  *M  * *T M  *Q  *A   *T  *Q  *A   *T  *Q  *A  
1 2 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  1.01 10 10.0 0.303 0.985  3.7 0.397 0.977  0.9 0.307 0.985 
2 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 5   1.61 4 6.4 0.268 0.989  4.7 0.288 0.987  0.9 0.292 0.986 
3 5 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  6.00 1 6.0 0.214 0.994  6.0 0.214 0.994  0.9 0.280 0.987 
4 3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  1.50 4 6.0 0.290 0.987  4.4 0.309 0.986  0.8 0.261 0.984 
5 3 2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  1.77 4 7.1 0.243 0.990  5.1 0.263 0.989  1.1 0.322 0.988 
6 3 1 0 0 0 0.05 5  0.85 12 10.2 0.212 0.993  4.7 0.288 0.987  0.7 0.216 0.992 
7 3 1 0.2 0 0.1 0.05 5  1.45 5 7.2 0.260 0.989  4.7 0.288 0.987  1.0 0.277 0.987 
8 3 1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.05 5  1.91 3 5.7 0.274 0.988  4.7 0.288 0.987  0.9 0.309 0.985 
9 3 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  1.42 5 7.1 0.264 0.989  4.7 0.288 0.987  1.0 0.283 0.987 
10 3 1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.05 5  1.91 3 5.7 0.275 0.988  4.7 0.288 0.987  0.9 0.310 0.984 
11 3 1 0.2 0.1 0 0.05 5  0.79 11 8.7 0.231 0.991  4.7 0.288 0.987  0.6 0.243 0.990 
12 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.05 5  2.03 3 6.1 0.286 0.988  4.7 0.288 0.987  1.2 0.327 0.984 
13 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.03 5  1.24 6 7.4 0.255 0.990  4.7 0.284 0.987  0.9 0.270 0.988 
14 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 5  1.98 3 6.0 0.288 0.988  4.7 0.299 0.987  1.0 0.343 0.982 
15 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 2.5  1.89 4 7.6 0.231 0.980  5.5 0.246 0.977  1.2 0.248 0.977 
16 3 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 10   1.20 5 6.0 0.310 0.994  4.0 0.336 0.993  0.7 0.344 0.992 
 Unit cost is the cost of preventive replacement, Rc ; characteristic life of defect arrivals 𝛾=10 time units. Base 
case is shaded, and parameter variations from base case shaded.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Hazard rate of the Weibull distribution of defect arrival for 10 = , 
=2 (solid line), =3 (dotted line), =5 (dashed line). 
 
In both the (M,T) policy and the pure inspection policy, 
availability decreases as   or 2  increase The availability 
of the pure inspection policy decreases as 1  increases across 
its entire range, but the availability of the (M,T) policy 
increases initially with 1  but is insensitive to further 
increase. The pure replacement policy is by definition 
insensitive to the imperfect-inspection parameters because 
there is no inspection.  
The ( , )M T  policy is cost-optimal over the range of values 
of the mean delay-time,  , considered, and T increases with 
increasing   and M  does not vary with  .  
Secondly, comparing case 6 to case 2, it can be seen that the 
marginal increased cost of imperfect inspection is 26%. 
Reduction in Pr(P G)  offers the greatest cost-benefit (the 
reduction in *Q  relative to case 2 is smaller in case 11 than in 
cases 7 or 9). This also benefits availability. Thus, to increase 
0
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the availability of protection one should perform more 
inspections but only if they do not report positives when the 
system is D or F.  
Finally, Inspection is cost-effective for a range of inspection 
costs (cases 13,2,14), and the superiority of the ( , )M T  policy 
increases with increasing downtime cost-rate, Fc  (cases 15, 2, 
16). The percentage increased cost of age-based replacement 
over the optimal policy is 6.5, 7.5 and 8.4% as Fc  increases 
from 2.5 to 5 to 10, and correspondingly 7.4, 9.0, and 11.0% 
for pure inspection. Further, it can be seen that as Fc increases 
the age limit for replacement decreases (7.6 to 6.4 to 6.0 
years), and inspection becomes more frequent. A consequence 
of this increasing frequency of maintenance is that the 
availability increases substantially (0.980 to 0.989 to 0.994).  
As Ic  increases inspection is less frequent and the 
availability decreases marginally. This is the opposite 
behavior to when Fc  increases, whereby the inspection 
frequency and the availability both increase. As the inspection 
interval decreases so does the downtime as defects and failures 
are more likely to be detected. 
IV. OTHER INSPECTION MODELS 
A. Repeated  Inspection 
If inspections are frequent and the mean delay-time is large, 
then one might react to the first positive inspection by 
postponing a replacement decision until the subsequent 
inspection. A sensible policy might then be inspect at times 
kT , 1, 2,...k = , and replace the system when the L-th 
consecutive inspection is positive.  
 However, difficulties with calculations arise because runs 
of positive inspections less than length L may precede the final 
renewal triggered by L consecutive positive inspections. Then 
it is necessary to consider the type 1 binomial distribution of 
order l [39] (the number of occurrences of l consecutive 
successes in a Bernoulli process). This allows one to 
determine Pr( 0)Z =  for a finite Bernoulli sequence of length 
n, 1,..., nX X , with Pr( 1)iX p= = and moving product of 
length L,  
1
0
L
i i jj
Z X
−
+=
=  , and sum 
1
1
n L
ii
Z Z
− +
=
=  (i.e. in a 
finite Bernoulli sequence the probability that there is no run of 
1s of length L). This distribution has been used in reliability 
[40,41]. 
Nonetheless, there is the further added problem that if a 
defect arises in the i-th inspection interval then there arises a 
Bernoulli sequence in which p changes part way through. 
Setting 1 2 0 = =  avoids this difficulty, but this is not 
pursued.  
B. Repeated  Inspection 0 =  
The combinatorial problem simplifies when 0 =  and 
when the policy replaces the system after the occurrence of L 
positive inspections that are not necessarily consecutive. This 
policy is now investigated for the imperfect inspection 
parameters defined in Table III.  
In reality it may make sense that 0 =  because the 
recognition of faults (defects or failures) when they are present 
is arguably a more important issue than the contrary, because a 
false negative (potentially an unmet demand) may have much 
greater consequence than a false positive (replacement of a 
good valve).   
TABLE III 
IMPERFECT INSPECTION PROBABILITIES 
  system state Z 
  G D F 
inspection 
outcome  
N 1 1  2  
P 0 11 −  21 −  
 
The formulae that follow are valid for 1L  . If 1L =  then 
one uses the formulae in section II.B with 0 = . 
For further simplicity, the model supposes that preventive 
replacement is not scheduled, so that M =  . 
Let K be the number of inspections until renewal as before. 
For the ( , )L T  policy, , 1, 2,...K L L L= + +  and  
2
0
1 1
1 22 0 ( 1)
1
0
Pr( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )d
(1 ) (1 ) ( )d ( )d
(1 ) ( ) ( )d .
T
L
Y X
T jT xL j L j
Y Xj j T x
T
L
Y X
K L F T x f x x
f y y f x x
F LT x f x x

 

−
− − +
= − −
= = − −
 
+ − −  
 
+ − −

  

 
This is because when K L=  the defect must arise in the 
first interval. Then the first term corresponds to the defect and 
the failure arising in the first interval and the following 
inspections are all positive (with probability 2(1 )
L− ). The 
second term corresponds to failure arising in the second or 
third,…, or L-th interval (hence the summation with these 
limits). Inspections that precede the failure are P with 
probability 11 −  in each case; inspections that follow the 
failure are P with probability 21 − . The final term 
corresponds to no failure arising before LT and each 
inspection is therefore N D . 
Consider now the remaining cases. When K L k= + , 
1, 2,...k = , a defect cannot arise later than in the interval 
( , ( 1) )kT k T+ . Otherwise renewal would occur before 
( )L k T+ . (For example, if L=2 and there are 5 inspections 
(k=3) a defect cannot appear later than 4T.) The following 
formula distinguishes various cases:  
1 1
2 21
( 1)
1 1 1
1 11
( 1)
2 2
( 1)
Pr( ) (1 )
1
( ) ( )d
1
(1 )
1
(1 ) ( )d ( )d
1
1
k L k i
i
iT
Y X
i T
k k L s j i mm
i j i m t
iT j T x
r L m
Y X
i T jT x
L k i
K L k
L
F iT x f x x
j i
m
L k j
f y y f x x
L m
L k i
L
 
 
 
+ − +
=
−
+ + − − + −
= = =
+ −
−
− −
+ − 
= + = −  
− 
−
− + 
+ −  
 
+ − − 
− 
− − 
+ − 
+ 
−


  
 
1 1
1 11
( 1)
(1 )
(( ) ) ( )d ,
k k i L
i
iT
Y X
i T
F L k T x f x x
 
+ − +
=
−
− 

+ −


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with min{ 1, 1}s L j i= − − + , max{0, }t j k= −  and 
max{0, }r k j m= − + . 
The first summation in this expression corresponds to the 
case in which defect and failure occur in the same interval. If 
so, a defect cannot occur later than in ( kT , ( 1)k T+ ). In the 
second summation, defect and failure occur in different 
intervals and a defect cannot occur later than in ( kT , ( 1)k T+
). The third summation considers the case when a defect 
occurs but there is no failure. 
The expected number of inspections is given by 
1
( ) Pr( )
k
E K L k K L k

=
= + = + , 
which can be alternatively written as 
1
( ) Pr( )
k
E K L K L k

=
= +  + . 
The downtime calculation proceeds as follows. Let kI  be 
an indicator function for the event that a failed system is 
renewed at the ( )L k+ -th inspection. Observe that 1kI =  if 
and only if 0jI =  j k . It therefore follows that the 
downtime is given by  
0 L k kk
W W I

+=
=  , 
where L kW +  is the downtime incurred when the system is 
renewed at the ( )L k+ -th inspection.  
For 0k = , it follows that  
0
2
0 0
1 1
1 22
0 ( 1)
( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )d ( )d
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )d ( )d ,
L
T T x
L
Y X
L j L j
j
T jT x
Y X
j T x
E W I
LT x y f y y f x x
LT x y f y y f x x

 
−
− − +
=
−
− −
 =
− − −
+ − − 
 
− − 
 
 

 
 
and for 0k  ,  
1 1
2 21
( 1) 0
1 1 1
1 11
2 2
( 1)
( )
(1 )
1
(( ) ) ( )d ( )d
1
(1 )
1
(1 )
1
(( ) ) ( )
L k k
k L k i
i
iT iT x
Y X
i T
k k L s j i mm
i j i m t
r L m
j T x
Y
jT x
E W I
L k i
L
L k T x y f y y f x x
j i
m
L k j
L m
L k T x y f y
 
 
 
+
+ − +
=
−
−
+ + − − + −
= = =
−
+ −
−
 =
+ − 
−  
− 
+ − −
− + 
+ −  
 
+ − − 
−  
− − 
+ − −

 
  
( 1) ( )d d .
iT
X
i T
f x y x
−
 
The expected downtime in a renewal cycle is then  
0
( ) ( )L k kk
E W E W I

+=
=  , 
and the cost-rate is  
I F R( , ) { ( ) ( ) } / ( ( ))Q L T c E K c E W c T E K= + +  . 
The availability, or uptime, is given by 
0
0
( )
( , ) 1
( ( ))
( )
1 .
( ) Pr( )
L k kk
k
E W
A L T
T E K
E W I
T L k K L k

+=

=
= −


= −
+ = +


 
The repeated inspection policy may be justified when the 
maintainer wants to extend system lifetime. Thus the 
maintainer is inclined to consider that a positive inspection is 
the result of a system that is defective rather than failed.  
Also, it may be interesting to determine the cost of a 
repeated inspection policy in these circumstances in order to 
understand the cost of “ignorance”, whereby a maintainer uses 
a policy (repeated inspection) that is necessarily cost-sub-
optimal. In practice one would wish to make a maintainer 
aware of the cost of procrastination. If a maintainer does not 
seek immediate replacement, then postponement of 
replacement may be preferred. This policy is considered in the 
next section. But first some numerical results for the repeated 
inspection policy are considered briefly. 
Again it is assumed that  0 =  and the parameter values as 
in section III are used. Table IV briefly shows some results 
and it can be seen that in each case * 1L =  as expected. 
Regarding the cost of “ignorance”, the marginal increased cost 
of repeated inspections can be calculated. Therein, repeated 
inspection leads to greater cost and lower availability with 
increasing L. The marginal increased cost of repeated 
inspection is greatest when the mean delay-time is smallest 
(39% for L=2 when 2 =  and 44% for L=2 when 0.5 = ). 
Also, as L increases, T* decreases (more frequent inspection) 
but not so much that LT* remains constant. Thus, increasing 
the inspection frequency does not compensate for repeated 
inspection, presumably because of the imperfect inspection. 
Indeed, for larger 1  or 2 , LT* increases with L more 
rapidly than for smaller 1  or 2 .  
C. Postponed Replacement, 0 =  
The inspection parameters are assumed as in Table III. 
Once a positive inspection has occurred, at kT  say, it is 
supposed that: the maintainer decides to postpone replacement 
for a time  ; during this period of postponement ( , )kT kT +  
there are no further inspections The rationale is that the 
maintainer seeks to extend the system life with a minimal cost, 
taking advantage of the delay-time, the time for which the 
system is defective but functional. Furthermore, the maintainer 
is aware that a problem exists and new inspections would 
incur an extra cost for a system which is close to replacement. 
Note, the cost-rate can be developed for 0  , but since this 
policy follows naturally from the previous (repeated 
inspection), the supposition that 0 =  is continued. 
 Another aspect already mentioned is that a N D  or N F  
inspection may be of greater concern that a P G  inspection. 
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TABLE IV 
RESULTS FOR REPEATED INSPECTION POLICY 
      1L =   2L =   3L =  
Case λ 𝛽1 𝛽2 Ic   *T  *Q  *A   *T  *Q  *A   *T  *Q  *A  
1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05  0.51 0.271 0.987  0.29 0.391 0.977  0.24 0.491 0.965 
2 1 0.2 0.1 0.05  0.60 0.243 0.990  0.34 0.342 0.982  0.26 0.423 0.974 
3 2 0.2 0.1 0.05  0.72 0.217 0.992  0.42 0.296 0.985  0.31 0.362 0.980 
4 1 0.1 0.1 0.05  0.63 0.235 0.990  0.36 0.332 0.982  0.27 0.411 0.975 
5 1 0.4 0.1 0.05  0.54 0.260 0.988  0.32 0.364 0.979  0.25 0.451 0.970 
6 1 0.2 0.05 0.05  0.63 0.237 0.990  0.35 0.335 0.983  0.27 0.414 0.975 
7 1 0.2 0.2 0.05  0.54 0.256 0.989  0.32 0.357 0.980  0.25 0.442 0.972 
8 1 0.2 0.1 0.02  0.43 0.185 0.994  0.26 0.240 0.989  0.22 0.297 0.980 
9 1 0.2 0.1 0.1  0.78 0.315 0.984  0.45 0.468 0.971  0.34 0.590 0.961 
Unit cost is the cost of preventive replacement, Rc ; F 5c = ; characteristic life of defect arrivals 10 =
time units, 3 = .  
 
 
 
Let K be the number of inspections until renewal, 
1, 2,...K =  In this model K is the number of inspections up to 
an including the first positive inspection, and it follows that 
Pr( 1)K = , Pr( 2)K = , and Pr( )K k=  are given by equations 
(1), (2) and (4) respectively but with 0 = . Thus K has the 
same distribution as the policy in section II.B (policy 1) with 
M =  . Furthermore, when 0 =  policy 1 is obtained as a 
special case with 0 = . 
The cycle length for this postponed replacement policy has 
the modification for the additional period of postponement. 
Thus the expected cycle length is 
1
( ) Pr( )
k
E V kT K k 

=
= + = . 
The downtime is different to policy 1, but in principle the 
derivation is similar. Thus, consider the event kS : inspection 
at kT  is positive and the defect arises at time x and the failure 
y time units later. The downtime conditional on kS  is 
xy kT x y = + − − ,  and the expected downtime is (for 
0  ) 
 
  
 
2 21 ( 1) 0
( 1)1 1
1 21 ( 1)
1 11 ( 1)
( )
(1 ) ( )d ( )d
( )d ( )d
(1 ) ( )d ( )d .
iT iT xk i
xy Y Xi k i i T
iT j T xj i k j
xy Y Xj i k j i T jT x
iT kT xk i
xy Y Xi k i i T kT x
E W
f y y f x x
f y y f x x
f y y f x x


 
 
 
−  −
= = −
+ −  − + − −
= = + − −
+ −  −
= = − −
= − 
+ 
+ − 
   
   
   
Here, in the first term the defect and failure occur in the same 
interval (( 1) , )i T iT−  and the failure is detected at ,kT k i . 
In the second term the failure occurs in the interval 
(( 1) , )j T jT−  subsequent to that of the defect and the failure 
is detected at , 1kT k j + . In both cases the positive 
inspection is due to a failure so it is a true positive. In the final 
term, a defect is detected at kT  and the failure occurs during 
the interval of postponement ( , )kT kT + .  
The expected cost of a cycle is then  
I F R1
( ) Pr( ) ( )
k
E U c k K k c E W c 

=
= = + + . 
For the parameter values in the cases in Table II, it follows 
that * 0 =  always, and so for brevity these results are 
omitted. The optimality of * 0 =  is contrary to the examples 
in [31] where 0    and the possibility of opportunity-based 
maintenance means * 0   is optimum. 
Nonetheless it is interesting to consider the cost-rate if the 
maintainer acts sub-optimally and postpones replacement. 
Indeed Figure 6 indicates that postponement is not a good 
policy, because of the possibility that the system is failed at a 
positive inspection and the consequent downtime is costly. 
Moreover, postponement is less appropriate when 2  is 
larger. 
 
 
Fig.6. Cost-rate, Q, as a function of the length of postponement, , for 
2 0 = (dash line), 2 0.1 =  (dotted), 2 0.2 =  (solid), and with T at its 
optimal value for the respective 2  and other parameters as base case (case 2 
in Table II).  
 
However, when 2 0 =  the cost rises more rapidly than for 
2 0   which is curious. This is perhaps because T is held at 
its optimum value for 0 = , and 0   may imply a smaller 
T*. Nonetheless, for 2 0 =  and a large mean delay-time, it 
might be expected that postponement to be optimal. 
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Finally, a policy in which the first positive inspection 
triggers a deeper, more costly inspection that verifies the state 
of the system can be considered. Then postponement only 
occurs if the system is defective (noting that because 0 =  
the system cannot be G). However, consideration of such a 
two stage inspection policy is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Other related analyses are also possible. For example, if two 
inspection tests were available, with costs I1c  and I2c  such 
that the cheaper inspection was less effective, then one could 
ask which test is preferred. Alternatively, one might consider 
what is an appropriate investment to improve inspection-test 
effectiveness.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies imperfect inspection of a protection 
system. This system is subject to a three state (G, D, F) failure 
process, and sojourns in the G and D states are random 
variables. The inspection outcome provides imperfect 
information about the system state that is quantified through a 
set of probabilities that are parameterized in the model. Given 
then a level of ignorance about the state of the protection 
system following an inspection, the maintainer must decide 
whether to replace the system. At a higher level, the 
maintainer must decide whether to inspect. These decisions 
are studied by developing the cost-rate of an inspection and 
replacement policy that is natural in this context.  
The novelty of the paper is the consideration of imperfect 
inspection for a protection system subject to a state (defective) 
that lies between the good and the failed states. Imperfect 
inspections can occur in both states although is less likely 
when the system is failed than defective. This mimics 
inspection of systems in real life.  Thus the benefit of 
modeling the defective state is that this may better represent 
the reality in which inspection provides imperfect information 
about the true underlying state of the protection system. Given 
this uncertainty, the maintainer has to decide if inspection is 
an effective strategy. Further, interest in modeling the 
defective state also emerges if the duration of use on-demand 
is non-negligible, so that there is the possibility of failure 
during the demand period when the system is defective at the 
start of the demand period. However, this would be another 
study.  
The analysis in this paper shows firstly that, since 
inspection may not be effective, it is natural that a maintainer 
would in ignorance replace the system at a particular age. The 
cases analyzed in the numerical example show that this policy 
is effective not only in terms of cost but also concerning 
availability. Thus preventive maintenance at MT is protection 
against low quality inspections. Then, secondly, the analysis 
shows that inspection is cost-effective provided the imperfect-
inspection probabilities are not too large. Therein, the most 
important (to the cost-rate) is Pr(P G) = . Finally, it is 
shown that there exist circumstances in which a pure 
inspection policy is near-cost-optimal. However, even when 
inspection is perfect, the ageing of the system implies that 
preventive replacement at MT remains a sensible policy. A 
two-stage policy that is an adaptation to the increasing hazard-
rate of an ageing system may provide further cost-benefit. 
This would be another study. 
The inclusion in the model of an additional imperfect-
inspection probability, 2 , adds another level of complexity 
to the cost-rate function. Thus the expressions for the cost-rate 
as well as its derivative are rather complicated. This leads to 
an empirical study with no analytical results. Nevertheless 
since inspection aims to detect defective and failed states, only 
small and medium values of T constitute the region of interest. 
The results in Tables II and IV present the global optimum in 
that region at least. 
For the repeated inspection policy, the imperfect-inspection 
probabilities are simplified in order to calculate the cost-rate 
and availability. Then it is found that repeated inspection leads 
to high cost and downtime, and postponement of replacement 
is not a good decision. However, this sub-optimality is in part 
due to the simplification (because it is likely that 
postponement would be justified when 0  ). Corresponding 
calculations in the general case (with a full set of imperfect-
inspection probabilities) would make an interesting and 
challenging study and may determine circumstances in which 
repeated inspection is preferable.  
It would be interesting to consider imperfection in 
inspection when inspection reports the system state (G, D or 
F) rather than the functionality of the system (N or P). This is 
a new, different model worthy of future investigation. 
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